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	<title>The Mortgage Crisis Blog &#187; New York Times</title>
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		<title>Financial Shock  A 360  Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion  and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/book/financial-shock-a-360-look-at-the-subprime-mortgage-implosion-and-how-to-avoid-the-next-financial-crisis/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2009 19:49:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[


&#160;Powered by Max Banner Ads&#160;Financial Shock  A 360  Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion  and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis



&#8220;The obvious place to start is the financial crisis and the clearest guide to it that I&#8217;ve read is Financial Shock by Mark Zandi&#8230;it is an impressively lucid guide to the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0137142900/?tag=wwwtheforexre-20"><strong>Financial Shock  A 360  Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion  and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis</strong></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/0137142900/?tag=wwwtheforexre-20"><br />
<img style="float:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding: 1m 2em;" src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51%2Bs76JwV4L._SL75_.jpg" alt="" /><br />
</a><br />
&#8220;The obvious place to start is the financial crisis and the clearest guide to it that I&#8217;ve read is Financial Shock by Mark Zandi&#8230;it is an impressively lucid guide to the big issues.&#8221;  &#8211;The New York Times &#8220;In Financial Shock, Mr. Zandi provides a concise and lucid account of the economic, political and regulatory forces behind this binge.&#8221;  &#8211;The Wall Street Journal &#8220;Aggressive builders, greedy lenders, optimistic home buyers: Zandi succinctly dissects the mortgage mess from start to (one hopes) finish.&#8221;  &#8211;U.S. News and World Report &#8220;A more detailed look at the crisis comes from economist Mark Zandi, co-founder of Moody&#8217;s Economy.com. His &#8220;Financial Shock&#8221; delves deeply into the history of the mortgage market, the bad loans, the globalization of trashy subprime paper and how homebuilders ran amok. Zandi&#8217;s analysis is eye-opening&#8230;he paints an impressive, more nuanced picture.&#8221;  &#8211;Kiplinger&#8217;s Personal Finance Magazine &#8220;If you wonder how it could be possible for a subprime mortgage loan to bring the global financial system and the U.S. economy to its knees, you should read this book.  No one is better qualified to provide this insight and advice than Mark Zandi.&#8221; &#8211;Larry Kudlow, Host, CNBC&#8217;s Kudlow &amp; Company &#8220;Every once in a while a book comes along that&#8217;s so important, it commands recognition. This is one of them. Zandi provides a  rilliant blow-by-blow account of how greed, stupidity, and recklessness brought the first major economic crises of the 21st  entury and the most serious since the Great Depression.&#8221;  &#8211;Bernard Baumohl,Managing Director, The Economic Outlook Group and best-selling author, The Secrets of Economic Indicators &#8220;Throughout the financial crisis Mark Zandi has played two important roles. He has insightfully analyzed its causes and thoughtfully recommended steps to alleviate it. This book continues those tasks and adds a third&#8211;providing a comprehensive and comprehensible explanation of the issues that is accessible to the general public and extremely useful to those who specialize in the area.&#8221;  &#8211;Barney Frank, Chairman, House Financial Services Committee The subprime crisis created a gigantic financial catastrophe. What happened? How did it happen? How can we prevent similar crises from happening again?  Mark Zandi answers all these critical questions&#8211;systematically, carefully, and in plain English. Zandi begins with a fast-paced overview and then illuminates the deepest causes, from the psychology of homeownership to Alan Greenspan&#8217;s missteps. You&#8217;ll see the home &#8220;flippers&#8221; at work and the real estate agents who cheered them on. You&#8217;ll learn how Internet technology and access to global capital transformed the mortgage industry, helping irresponsible lenders drive out good ones. Zandi demystifies the complex financial engineering that enabled lenders to hide deepening risks, shows how global investors eagerly bought in, and explains how flummoxed regulators failed to prevent disaster, despite crucial warning signs.  Most important, Zandi offers indispensable advice for investors who must recognize emerging bubbles, policymakers who must improve oversight, and citizens who must survive whatever comes next.  *Liar&#8217;s loans, flippers, predatory lenders, delusional homebuilders How the housing market came unhinged, and the whirlwind came together*Alan Greenspan&#8217;s trillion-dollar bet Betting on the boom, ignoring the bubble*The subprime market goes global Worldwide investors get a piece of the action&#8211;and reap the results*Wall Street&#8217;s alchemists: conjuring up Frankenstein New financial instruments and their hidden contents*Back to the future: risk management for the 21st century Respecting the &#8220;animal spirits&#8221; that drive even the most sophisticated markets</p>
<h4 style="text-align: left;color: red">User Ratings and Reviews</h4>
<p><strong style="color:#ffd000; background-color:#fafafa">3 Stars</strong> <em> Like An Autopsy While The Corpse Is Still Twitching</em><br />
This review is being written two days before Barack Obama takes the oath of office, facing the worst economy any President has had to deal with in decades. This book by Mark Zandi came out in July, 2008. The title of this review reflects the fact that much of what Zandi was writing about back in the spring of 2008 was still unfolding.</p>
<p>Much has happened since then. Lehmann Brothers went under, the government rushed into a huge bail out of the banks and billions of dollars have been thrown around with seeming little effect. The economy has failed to respond, conventional monetary policy remedies seem to be ineffective, unemployment is rising, and the global economy is also tanking.</p>
<p>Zandi is already moving to update his account; a new edition is scheduled for March 23, 2009 so save your money for that one. Financial Shock (Revised and Expanded Edition), (Paperback): Global Panic and Government Bailouts &#8212; How We Got Here and What Must Be Done to Fix It</p>
<p>This edition nonetheless does have some use still. In a chapter by chapter progression, Zandi begins with the subprime market, moves on to look at how the housing market became such an important basis of the economy, and then starts unraveling all of the acronyms and other machinations that led us to the great unraveling we&#8217;re now facing.</p>
<p>If there is one thing that might be useful for the new edition, it would be the inclusion of a handy glossary for quick reference; while Zandi does a good job explaining what the various acronyms are and how they work, keeping them all straight is a bit of work. (ie: Alt A, CDOs, CDSs, SIVs, etc.)  I found myself wishing I had made notes while reading each chapter. There&#8217;s a lot of material which may seem exotic to someone not immersed in economics and finance. That being said, Zandi does his best to make his explanations clear and accessible.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, this book should be taken with a grain of salt. Zandi notes that as someone intimately connected to the credit rating industry via his relationship with Moody&#8217;s, he is not at liberty to address that component of the collapse. In the months since the book came out, much has come out about the role of credit ratings agencies in events. Supposed to be impartial watchmen over the actual worth of assets and financial deals, they instead became co-cospirators enabling the worst behavior. Zandi is donating all profits from the book to a non-profit organization working to invest in inner city projects. Whether that can be taken as an act of penance I can not say.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s also the political aspect to consider. Much of what has happened to the markets could not have happened without years of conservative fiscal policies that deregulated markets and removed long standing legal firewalls intended to keep banks from getting into troubles that would spread. In addition there was a nearly complete failure to realize how much financial activity was moving into institutions with almost no government oversight or regulation. As an advisor and contributor to the campaign of John McCain, Zandi&#8217;s credibility should be more than a little tarnished by this connection to the failed economic ideology McCain champions. Caveat emptor.</p>
<p><strong style="color:#ffd000; background-color:#fafafa">4 Stars</strong> <em> The Story of 2008</em><br />
This book simply lays out how we got to where we are.  It is written for the non-accountant, non-economist types (like me) who follow the markets out of interest.</p>
<p>It is timely (to some degree) and explains recent history.  I would recommend it to anyone who has an interest in finances or anyone wondering how we got here.</p>
<p>It is mostly about the mortgage crisis, and not the recent credit crisis developments. He looks at all players, including banks, the Government, investors, home buyers, and many more.</p>
<p>The only issue I have with this book is that there needs to be a sequel to explain what has devloped since its publication!</p>
<p><strong style="color:#ffd000; background-color:#fafafa">5 Stars</strong> <em> Absolutely the best book on the sub-prime crisis</em><br />
I have been reading a number of books on the sub-prime crisis.  Some of them are quite good.  The Trillion-Dollar Meltdown, for example, is an excellent introduction to the high-level hocus-pocus that Wall Street was engaging in to bring on the crisis.  Chain of Blame gives a good journalistic description of the history of the major players in the sub-prime industry.  Greenpan&#8217;s Bubbles gives an excellent summation of the prosecution&#8217;s opening argument in People v. Alan Greenspan, making the case that it was all the fault of the Fed.</p>
<p>This book, however, is absolutely, unequivocally the best book on the subject.  It is everything that you want such a book to be.  First, and foremost, Zandi knows the subject.  He has in-depth knowledge of both economic theory and of the details of what actually happened in the market.  His depth of knowledge is astonishing</p>
<p>Second, he covers every aspect of the subject.  Most of the books written on this subject cover only part of it.  Zandi covers the waterfront.  He understands the issues, in detail, from the policy decisions of the Federal Reserve Board to the cyclic nature of the housing industry.  In a relatively short book, he covers literally every aspect of the subject.</p>
<p>Finally, he makes balanced judgments without being judgmental or moralzing.  His tone is very detached.  He actually wants to understand what happened, not find the bad guys to pillory.  On the Fed, for example, he gives a very clear explanation of what Greenspan was thinking, what he was trying to do, how it worked in some ways and was a disaster in other ways.</p>
<p>He has the expected final chapter on how to fix things. It was short, but very good.  I thought some of his ideas were kind of screwy &#8212; why would it help to have national uniformity in foreclosure laws, for example? &#8212; but, by and large, his ideas were practical and judicious.  I think that every sane observer of the situation agrees that better regulation of the out of control mortgage and mortage-backed security industry is needed, and Zandi gives a good idea of how to do that, without overdoing it.</p>
<p><strong style="color:#ffd000; background-color:#fafafa">5 Stars</strong> <em> Outstanding!!</em><br />
This book is very well written.  Zandi writes in an easy to read style that is informative and interesting.  I really enjoyed this book.  It is simple enough for the laymen, but still extremely interesting and informative for someone with extensive financial and economic knowledge.</p>
<p><strong style="color:#ffd000; background-color:#fafafa">4 Stars</strong> <em> Educational &amp; Sometimes Shocking</em><br />
Billed as &#8220;A 360 degree Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion, and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis&#8221;, Mark Zandi&#8217;s &#8220;Financial Shock&#8221; looks way beyond subprime mortgages, as well it should, to underlying problems of the credit markets, financial engineering of mortgage backed securities and derivatives, home builders,  etc. and ultimately to a world-wide debt binge that led to over-leveraging and the collective failure of investors of all stripes to adequately hedge or otherwise protect themselves against the risk of adverse events like the collapse of the housing bubble.</p>
<p>Many readers will know enough to breeze through the chapter on subprime mortgages and those with humdrum titles like &#8220;Everyone Should Own a Home&#8221; and &#8220;Home Builders Run Aground&#8221;.  But this reader found Zandi&#8217;s explanation of global participation in the US credit markets fascinating.  For example did you know that &#8220;foreigners&#8221; held approximately $7 trillion in U.S. &#8220;credit market instruments&#8221; and nearly a third of all U.S. mortgages</p>
<p>Also interesting is the chapter on financial engineering, which explains the alphabet soup of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and their respective roles in offloading the risk of home mortgages from the originating lenders onto the &#8220;shadow banking system.&#8221;  In this chapter Zandi cites the following statistic: &#8220;By the second quarter of 2007, &#8230; the shadow banking system provided an astounding $6 trillion in credit &#8230;&#8221; , almost as much as traditional banks.</p>
<p>Zandi ignores the role of his own employer (Moody&#8217;s) in providing optimistic credit ratings for mortgage-backed securities by stating in the introduction, &#8220;To avoid any appearance of conflict of interest, I have no choice but to leave discussion of that facet of the subprime shock to others.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;Boom, Bubble, Bust and Crash&#8221;  will be a tough chapter to read if you ignored the early warning signs of a real bubble bursting.  Zandi cites July 30, 2007 when two of Bear Stearns&#8217; hedge funds collapsed as the start of the crash.  If you connected those dots with the ensuing credit crunch that destroyed the stock market in the second half of 2008, you&#8217;re going to feel pretty smart after reading this and the ensuing chapter, &#8220;Credit  Crunch.&#8221;  The rest of you (self included) will feel pretty sheepish.  Or maybe you&#8217;ll ask, &#8220;Why didn&#8217;t my financial advisor or broker warn me?&#8221;</p>
<p>One quibble is that Zandi uses the Price-to-rent Ratio to track relative home values rather than the more meaningful price-to-median income, a measure of affordability.  And by failing to adjust for declining cost of capital (mortgage rates) since the 1980s, Zandi overstates the relative increase in home valuations in the mid 2000s.  I expected more from Moody&#8217;s chief economist.</p>
<p>The &#8220;Credit  Crunch&#8221; chapter explains how the problem was much, much bigger than subprime mortgages.  Zandi states, &#8220;It is difficult to see how mortgages could have been the catalyst for such a wrenching financial crisis&#8221;   because &#8220;mortgage loan losses were less than 5% of the $11 trillion &#8230; U.S. mortgage loans outstanding&#8221; and less than</p>
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		<title>CRA Commitments in 2003-04 = $2,350,000,000,000</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/cra-commitments-in-2003-04-2350000000000/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2009 04:04:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[From my new VDARE.com column : You’ve heard over and over about how the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could not bear any blame for the mortgage meltdown that began in 2007 because the time lag was too vast. As the New York Times editorialized on October 15, 2008: “First, how could a 30-plus-year-old law be responsible for a crisis that has occurred only in recent years?” That seems like a good question. Th]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From my new VDARE.com column : You’ve heard over and over about how the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) could not bear any blame for the mortgage meltdown that began in 2007 because the time lag was too vast. As the New York Times editorialized on October 15, 2008: “First, how could a 30-plus-year-old law be responsible for a crisis that has occurred only in recent years?” That seems like a good question. Th</p>
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		<title>British Regulator Quits as Accusations Mount in Banking Crisis (New York Times)</title>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2009 11:39:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://us.rd.yahoo.com/dailynews/rss/search/Mortgage+crisis/SIG=13gl8v5a8/*http%3A//dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/british-regulator-quits-as-accusations-mount-in-banking-crisis/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The deputy head of the watchdog agency that regulates Britain’s banks resigned hurriedly on Wednesday after he was accused of firing a whistle-blower who had warned in 2004 that Halifax Bank of Scotland , or HBOS, the fast-expanding mortgage lender both men then worked for, was accumulating levels of debt that put it at unacceptably high risk.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The deputy head of the watchdog agency that regulates Britain’s banks resigned hurriedly on Wednesday after he was accused of firing a whistle-blower who had warned in 2004 that Halifax Bank of Scotland , or HBOS, the fast-expanding mortgage lender both men then worked for, was accumulating levels of debt that put it at unacceptably high risk.</p>
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		<title>Asian Bailout of USA: “May You Live In Interesting Times”</title>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2009 04:25:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[Wed 11 Feb 2009Uncategorized By Gayle Plato-BesleyAccording to the New York Times, the Asian bond market is losing the taste for American Pie:“In the past five years, China has spent as much as one-seventh of its entire economic output on the purchase of foreign debt - largely U.S. Treasury bonds and American mortgage-backed securities. But now, Beijing is seeking to pay for its own $600 billion economic stimulus - just as tax revenue falls sharply as the Chinese economy slows. Regulators have]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wed 11 Feb 2009Uncategorized By Gayle Plato-BesleyAccording to the New York Times, the Asian bond market is losing the taste for American Pie:“In the past five years, China has spent as much as one-seventh of its entire economic output on the purchase of foreign debt &#8211; largely U.S. Treasury bonds and American mortgage-backed securities. But now, Beijing is seeking to pay for its own $600 billion economic stimulus &#8211; just as tax revenue falls sharply as the Chinese economy slows. Regulators have</p>
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		<title>February 9, 2009</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/february-9-2009/</link>
		<comments>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/february-9-2009/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2009 13:59:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Crisis]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[NEW YORK TIMES:ANGELO WHO? After months of delay, Senator Christopher Dodd has offered a fuller but less than satisfactory account of the V.I.P. mortgage loans extended to him by a key player in the subprime mortgage crisis. Mr. Dodd, the banking committee chairman who oversees remedies for the continuing financial crisis, denied any ethical wrongdoing or “sweetheart deals” in the $781,000 house refinancings he got through the Countrywide Financial Corporation. Even so, the senator announced hi]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>NEW YORK TIMES:ANGELO WHO? After months of delay, Senator Christopher Dodd has offered a fuller but less than satisfactory account of the V.I.P. mortgage loans extended to him by a key player in the subprime mortgage crisis. Mr. Dodd, the banking committee chairman who oversees remedies for the continuing financial crisis, denied any ethical wrongdoing or “sweetheart deals” in the $781,000 house refinancings he got through the Countrywide Financial Corporation. Even so, the senator announced hi</p>
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		<title>Blankfein on How Wall Street Underestimated Risk (New York Times)</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/blankfein-on-how-wall-street-underestimated-risk-new-york-times/</link>
		<comments>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/blankfein-on-how-wall-street-underestimated-risk-new-york-times/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2009 13:09:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chief Executive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Goldman Sachs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lloyd]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New York Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wall Street]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://us.rd.yahoo.com/dailynews/rss/search/Mortgage+crisis/SIG=13220m194/*http%3A//dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/blankfein-on-how-wall-street-underestimated-risk/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein faulted the financial industry for what he considers to be multi-faceted failures of risk management in the period before the current financial crisis.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein faulted the financial industry for what he considers to be multi-faceted failures of risk management in the period before the current financial crisis.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>U.S. Bank Bailout to Rely in Part on Private Money</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/us-bank-bailout-to-rely-in-part-on-private-money/</link>
		<comments>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/us-bank-bailout-to-rely-in-part-on-private-money/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2009 12:10:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Administration Officials]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bailout Plan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank Bailout]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking System]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economic Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge Funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New York Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private Equity Funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private Money]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reports Administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U S Bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wall Street]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Willingness]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/us-bank-bailout-to-rely-in-part-on-private-money/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Wall Street helped produce the global financial and economic crisis. Now, as the Obama administration prepares to unveil a revised bailout plan for the banking system, policy makers hope Wall Street can be part of the solution, The New York Times’s Floyd Norris reports.Administration officials told The Times that the plan, to be announced Tuesday, was likely to depend in part on the willingness of private investors other than banks — like hedge funds, private equity funds and perhaps even insura]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wall Street helped produce the global financial and economic crisis. Now, as the Obama administration prepares to unveil a revised bailout plan for the banking system, policy makers hope Wall Street can be part of the solution, The New York Times’s Floyd Norris reports.Administration officials told The Times that the plan, to be announced Tuesday, was likely to depend in part on the willingness of private investors other than banks — like hedge funds, private equity funds and perhaps even insura</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Dow Imperiled by Its Deal for Rohm &amp; Haas</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/dow-imperiled-by-its-deal-for-rohm-haas/</link>
		<comments>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/dow-imperiled-by-its-deal-for-rohm-haas/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2009 11:51:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amp]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Business Column]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dow Chemical]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Nocera]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Profession]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lifetime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New York Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rohm Haas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[S Joe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Scorn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wall Street]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/dow-imperiled-by-its-deal-for-rohm-haas/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[To utter something along the lines that maybe, just maybe, deals that stop making sense ought to be called off, or at least rejiggered, especially in the middle of a once-in-a-lifetime financial crisis, invites withering scorn, especially if you say it to someone on Wall Street or in the legal profession.So says The New York Times’s Joe Nocera, who examines the battle between Dow Chemical and Rohm &#38; Haas in his latest Talking Business column. Almost everybody he spoke to for the column thought D]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To utter something along the lines that maybe, just maybe, deals that stop making sense ought to be called off, or at least rejiggered, especially in the middle of a once-in-a-lifetime financial crisis, invites withering scorn, especially if you say it to someone on Wall Street or in the legal profession.So says The New York Times’s Joe Nocera, who examines the battle between Dow Chemical and Rohm &#038; Haas in his latest Talking Business column. Almost everybody he spoke to for the column thought D</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Angelo Who? (New York Times)</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/angelo-who-new-york-times/</link>
		<comments>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/angelo-who-new-york-times/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2009 05:50:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angelo Mozilo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christopher Dodd]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Loans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New York Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Senator Christopher Dodd]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Subprime Mortgage Crisis]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://us.rd.yahoo.com/dailynews/rss/search/Mortgage+crisis/SIG=11p5hmkqt/*http%3A//www.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/opinion/09mon4.html</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Senator Christopher Dodd needs to give a better account of the V.I.P. mortgage loans extended to him by, Angelo Mozilo, a key player in the subprime mortgage crisis.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Senator Christopher Dodd needs to give a better account of the V.I.P. mortgage loans extended to him by, Angelo Mozilo, a key player in the subprime mortgage crisis.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Says it all, part 2</title>
		<link>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/says-it-all-part-2/</link>
		<comments>http://www.themortgagecrisisblog.com/mortgage-crisis/says-it-all-part-2/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2009 10:52:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>The Mortgage Crisis Blog</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Spectator]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking System]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Home Ownership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Loans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mortgage Lenders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mortgages]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Narratives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New York Times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peter J Wallison]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[President Bush]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[True Origins]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://newmarksdoor.typepad.com/mainblog/2009/02/says-it-all-part-2.html</guid>
		<description><![CDATA["The True Origins of This Financial Crisis". (Peter J. Wallison, American Spectator, Feb. 2009.) Two narratives seem to be forming to describe the underlying causes of the financial crisis. One, as outlined in a New York Times front-page story on Sunday, December 21, is that President Bush excessively promoted growth in home ownership without sufficiently regulating the banks and other mortgage lenders that made the bad loans. The result was a banking system suffused with junk mortgages, the]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;The True Origins of This Financial Crisis&#8221;. (Peter J. Wallison, American Spectator, Feb. 2009.) Two narratives seem to be forming to describe the underlying causes of the financial crisis. One, as outlined in a New York Times front-page story on Sunday, December 21, is that President Bush excessively promoted growth in home ownership without sufficiently regulating the banks and other mortgage lenders that made the bad loans. The result was a banking system suffused with junk mortgages, the</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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